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Abstract. ITRU cryptosystem is a public key cryptosystem and one
of the known variants of NTRU cryptosystem. Instead of working in a
truncated polynomial ring, ITRU cryptosystem is based on the ring of
integers. The authors claimed that ITRU has better features comparing to
the classical NTRU, such as having a simple parameter selection algorithm,
invertibility, and successful message decryption, and better security. In this
paper, we present an attack technique against the ITRU cryptosystem,
and it is mainly based on a simple frequency analysis on the letters of
ciphertexts.
1. History of NTRU and its variants
1.1. Introduction.
The study of cryptography has been interested to cryptologists for long
time because the necessity of transferring important information secretly,
which established the existence of many types of cryptosystems. It is well-
known that there are two types of cryptography, which are symmetric cryp-
tography and asymmetric cryptography (or, public key cryptography). In the
symmetric cryptosystem, the same key being used in the encryption and de-
cryption procedures. However, in the asymmetric cryptosystem two different
keys are used; the public key that should be announced to everyone and the
corresponding private key has to be secret. In fact, many models of these cryp-
tosystems have been established by several cryptologists. Indeed, symmetric
key cryptography is by far more efficient; we only use public key cryptogra-
phy to establish secret communication and the shared secret keys of symmetric
encryption. The security of many public key cryptosystems such as Rivest,
Shamir and Adelman (RSA) cryptosystem [37], McEliece cryptosystem [27],
ElGamal cryptosystem [7], or elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) [23] is based
on different intractable mathematical problems. In practice, all of these pub-
lic key cryptosystems are far slower than symmetric cryptosystems such as
2020 Mathematics Subject Classification. 94B40, 94A60, 68P25.
Key words and phrases. NTRU, ITRU, public key cryptography, cryptanalysis.
181
182 H. R. HASHIM, A. MOLNÁR AND SZ. TENGELY
Data Encryption Standard (DES) cryptosystem [33] or Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) cryptosystem [34] in terms of space and computational com-
plexity and for this reason they are often simply used to solve the problem of
sharing a secret key for use in a symmetric cryptosystem (for more details,
see e.g. [15], [44] and the references given there). Therefore, the main target
for cryptologists is the discovery of a fast public key cryptosystem based on
different hard problems. Thus, in the following we introduce such public key
cryptosystem and its variants.
1.2. NTRU cryptosystem and its variants.
In 1996, Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman [16] proposed a class of fast pub-
lic key cryptosystems called NTRU (Nth Degree Truncated Polynomial Ring)
cryptosystem, which was published in 1998. This cryptosystem is considered
as a lattice-based public key cryptosystem, and it is the first asymmetric cryp-
tosystem based on the polynomial ring Z[X](XN−1) . Indeed, it has very good fea-
tures comparing to other public key cryptosystems such as reasonably short,
easily created keys, high speed, and low memory requirements. Its encryption
and decryption procedures rely on a mixing system presented by polynomial
algebra combined with a clustering principle based on elementary probability
theory. From its lattice-based structure, the security of the NTRU cryptosys-
tem is based on the hardness of solving the Closest Vector Problem (CVP),
which is a computational problem on lattices closely related to Shortest Vector
Problem (SVP) and considered to be NP hard (non-deterministic polynomial-
time hardness) (for more details, see [29] and the references given there ). In
fact, the inventors [16] proved that the NTRU cryptosystem preforms much
faster than other public key cryptosystems. For instance, the encryption and
decryption procedure of a message block of length N takes O(N2) operations
using the NTRU cryptosystem and this is considerably faster than the O(N3)
operations required by RSA cryptosystem. Further, the key lengths of NTRU
cryptosystem are O(N), which is very good comparing to the O(N2) key
lengths required by other fast public key cryptosystems presented in [14] and
[27]. Furthermore, preliminary experimental results by Shen, Du, and Chen
[41] showed that the speed of the NTRU cryptosystem is much faster than
that of the RSA cryptosystem in which the key generation is more than 200
times faster, the encryption is almost 3 times faster, and the decryption is
about 30 times faster. These results show the applicable possibility of NTRU
cryptosystem in mobile Java systems.
For further enhancement of the security of the NTRU cryptosystem, re-
searchers have been proposing several variants of NTRU cryptosystem. Start-
ing with a generalization of NTRU cryptosystem proposed by Banks and Sh-
parlinski [1] with non-invertible polynomials on the same ring as NTRU. The
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main advantage of this variant is that it is more secure against some of the
known attacks on the original NTRU cryptosystem such as lattice attack. On
the other hand, it is less efficient than NTRU since the lengths of its public
key and the ciphertext are twice the ones in the classical NTRU cryptosys-
tem. Another analogue of NTRU cryptosystem was introduced by Gaborit,
Ohler, and Solé [10] called CTRU cryptosystem in which the ring Z in NTRU
cryptosystem is replaced by the ring of polynomials F2[T ]. A new variant of
the NTRU cryptosystem was presented by Coglianese and Goi [5] called Ma-
TRU cryptosystem. However, it operates under the same general principles
as the NTRU cryptosystem, it works in a different ring with a different lin-
ear transformation in the encryption and decryption procedures. As a result,
MaTRU cryptosystem is more efficient and has a better security level compar-
ing to NTRU cryptosystem. Kouzmenko [24] used Gaussian integers instead
of the ring Z in NTRU cryptosystem to propose a generalization of NTRU
cryptosystem. However, it is not as efficient as NTRU, this scheme is slightly
more secure against lattice attack than NTRU cryptosystem. By replacing
the ring Z in NTRU cryptosystem by the Eisenstein integers Z[ζ3], Nevins,
KarimianPour, and Miri [31] proposed another variant, which we they called
it by ETRU cryptosystem, which presents a more difficult lattice problem for
lattice attacks, for the same level of decryption failure security. Malekian,
Zakerolhosseini, and Mashatan [26] presented a new variant called QTRU
cryptosystem based on using the ring of quaternions instead of the ring Z in
NTRU cryptosystem. They showed that the structure of QTRU cryptosystem
gives more resistant to some lattice-based attacks comparing to the classical
NTRU cryptosystem. Other variants have been introduced by many authors
such ILTRU cryptosystem, which is a modification of ETRU cryptosystem,
introduced by Karbasi and Atani [21]. The security of this cryptosystem is
based on the worst case hardness of the approximate both SVP and CVP in
ideal lattices. Last but not least, we mention one of the known variants of
NTRU cryptosystem called ITRU cryptosystem, which was presented in 2017
by Gaithuru, Salleh, and Mohamad [11]. Instead of working in a truncated
polynomial ring, ITRU cryptosystem is based on the ring of integers. The
authors claimed that ITRU has better features comparing to the classical
NTRU such as having a simple parameter selection algorithm, invertibility,
and successful message decryption. Indeed, the classical NTRU cryptosystem
has a probability of decryption failure of 2−145. Moreover, they claimed that
the ITRU has a better security than NTRU, since its security is based on the
integer factorization problem. Other variants of NTRU cryptosystem can be
found, e.g. in [4], [22], [32], [35], [42], [46]. However, the inventors of NTRU
cryptosystem ensured that it is extremely unlikely to several potential at-
tacks against the scheme to succeed (particularly, the standard lattice-based
attack) since the secret key was surrounded by a “cloud” of exponentially
many unrelated lattice vectors. Many attacks have been preformed against
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the NTRU and its variants, and in the following we mention some of these
attacks (mainly attacks against NTRU) .
1.3. Attacks.
In 2001, Coppersmith and Shamir [6] showed that the security of NTRU
cryptosystem is not necessarily based on the difficulty of reducing the NTRU
lattice since the lattice reduction can be one of the practical attacks against
NTRU cryptosystem. In fact, they presented a lattice-based attack, which
can either find the original secret key k or an alternative key k′ which can
be used instead of k to obtain the plaintexts by decrypting the corresponding
ciphertexts with only slightly higher computational complexity. After that,
many types of lattice-based attacks on the NTRU cryptosystem and its vari-
ants have been occurred. It is important to mention that all of these attacks
have focused primarily on the “secret key recovery” problem. For instance,
Gentry [12] proposed lattice-based attacks that are especially effective when
N , in the polynomial ring that used in the classical NTRU cryptosystem, is
composite. He used low-dimensional lattices to find a folded version of the
private key, where this key has d coefficients where d dividing N. This folded
private key is used to recover a folding of the plaintext, or it helps to recover
the original private key. However, a chosen ciphertext attack is another type
of attacks, which was already used in [13] or [19] against other public key cryp-
tosystems. Here, the attacker constructs invalid cipher messages. By knowing
the plaintexts corresponding to his messages, she can get some information
about the private key or even recover it. Such an attack was used against the
NTRU cryptosystem by Jaulmes and Joux [18]. Similar attack to the later
one was proposed by Meskanen and Renvalla [28]. Another attack on NTRU
cryptosystem hardware implementations, that employ scan based Design-for-
Test (DFT) techniques, was proposed by Kamal and Youssef [20], and they
called it a scan-based side channel attack. This attack determines the scan
chain structure of the polynomial multiplication circuits used in the decryp-
tion algorithm which allows the cryptanalyst to efficiently retrieve the secret
key. In case of CTRU cryptosystem, Kouzmenko [24] showed that CTRU
was completely vulnerable to a simple attack. More attack techniques against
NTRU cryptosystem and its variants can be found, i.e. [17], [25], [30], [36],
[38] and the references given there.
In fact, most of the attacks against the NTRU cryptosystem especially the
ones mentioned above focus primarily on the “secret key recovery” problem.
Therefore, in this paper we present an attack technique to break the ITRU
cryptosystem proposed in [11]. Indeed, the construction of ITRU (see Section
2) shows that ITRU is a substitution cipher. Therefore, we use one of the
best effective attacks against substitution ciphers presented by the frequency
analysis technique. This attack is mainly based on a simple frequency analysis
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on the letters of ciphertexts using a function implemented in SageMath [43]
as frequency_distribution(). As a result, this techniques will recover the
corresponding plaintexts immediately with no need of having the private keys.
2. The ITRU Cryptosystem
As mentioned earlier, instead of working in a truncated polynomial ring
ITRU cryptosystem is based on the ring of integers. The parameters and the
main steps of ITRU cryptosystem are as follows.
 The value of p is suggested to be 1000.
 Random integers f, g and r are chosen such that f is invertible modulo
p.
 A prime q is fixed satisfying q > p · r · g + f ·m, where m is the rep-
resentation of the message in decimal form. The suggested conversion
is based on ASCII conversion tables, that is the one with a→ 97.
 One computes Fp ≡ f−1 (mod p) and Fq ≡ f−1 (mod q). These
computations can be done by using the extended Euclidean algorithm.
 The public key is consisted of h and q such that
(2.1) h ≡ p · Fq · g (mod q).
 The encryption procedure is similar to the one applied in NTRU cryp-
tosystem [16], one generated a random integer r and computes
(2.2) e ≡ r · h+m (mod q).
 To get the plaintext from the ciphertext, one determines
(2.3) a ≡ f · e (mod q).
 Recovering the message is done by computing
(2.4) Fp · a (mod p).
In order to show this later recovery leads to the original plaintext at the end,
one can show that as follows. Combining equation (2.3) with (2.2) and (2.1),
with use of the fact that f · Fq ≡ 1 (mod q) we obtain that
(2.5) a ≡ f ·e ≡ f ·(r ·h+m) ≡ f ·(r ·p ·Fq ·g+m) ≡ r ·p ·g+f ·m (mod q).
It remains to compute Fp · a (mod p) by substituting (2.5) in (2.4) and using
the fact that f · Fp ≡ 1 (mod p). We obtain that
Fp · a ≡ Fp · (r · p · g + f ·m) ≡ Fp · f ·m ≡ m (mod p).
We also emphasize that the only reason that we can switch from mod q to mod
p is because of the hypothesis in the third step above (i.e. q > p · r · g+f ·m),
which ensures that the integer value of that string is less than q and so when
we do mod q we have selected the correct coset.
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3. ITRU Cryptosystem Implementation
We note that to fix q one needs a bound for the largest possible value of
the representation, so here if one only uses the letters from ’A’ to ’Z’ and ’a’
to ’z’, then the maximum is 122. In the following SageMath implementation
we will use 255, however one can use a greater upper bound for the represen-




2 pretty_ print(′The message is:′, s)
3 r = 8
4 p = 1000
5 F = Set([k for k in range(2, 1000) if gcd(k, 1000) == 1])
6 f = F. random_element()
7 S =Set([2..1000])
8 g = S. random_element()
9 m =[ord(k) for k in s]
10 pretty_print(′ The ASCII code of the message :′, m)
11 q =next_prime(p ∗ r ∗ g + 255 ∗ f)
12 Fp = (1/f)%p
13 Fq = (1/f)%q
14 h = (p ∗ Fq ∗ g)%q
15 pretty_print(′ Large modulus :′, q)
16 pretty_print(′ Public key :′, h)
17 pretty_print(′ Private key pair :′, (f, Fp))
18 e = [((r ∗ h) +m[i])%q for i in [0..len(m)− 1]]
19 pretty_print(′ The encrypted message :′, e)
20 a = [(f ∗ e[i])%q for i in [0..len(e)− 1]]
21 pretty_print(html(r′$f\cdot e \pmod{q}$ is: $%s$′%latex(a)))
22 C = [(Fp ∗ a[l])%p for l in [0..len(a)− 1]]
23 pretty_print(html(r′$F_p \cdot a \pmod {q}$ is: $%s$′% latex(C)))
24 D =[chr(k) for k in C]
25 pretty_print(′ The original message: ′,′ ′.join(D))
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Output
The message is: Cryptanalysis
The ASCII code of the message: [67, 114, 121, 112, 116, 97, 110, 97, 108,
121, 115, 105, 115]
Large modulus: 6186617
Public key: 180058
Private key pair: (73, 137)
The encrypted message: [1440531, 1440578, 1440585, 1440576, 1440580,
1440561, 1440574, 1440561, 1440572, 1440585, 1440579, 1440569, 1440579]
f ·e (mod q) is: [6172891, 6176322, 6176833, 6176176, 6176468, 6175081,
6176030, 6175081, 6175884, 6176833, 6176395, 6175665, 6176395]
Fp·a (mod p) is: [67, 114, 121, 112, 116, 97, 110, 97, 108, 121, 115, 105, 115]
The original message: Cryptanalysis
4. ITRU Plaintext Recovery
By using the frequency analysis technique, we can recover the correspond-
ing plaintexts of any ciphertext encrypted using ITRU with no need of recov-
ering the private keys. This technique mainly focuses on studying of the
frequency of letters or groups of letters and counting their appearance in a
ciphertext. More precisely, the frequency analysis is based on the fact that,
in any given piece of text, certain letters and combinations of letters occur
with varying frequencies. For example, in any typical text in English lan-
guage, letters E, T, A and O are the most common, while letters Z, Q and
X are not as frequently used. For more details about the frequency of let-
ters in English, see e.g. Table 1 in [2]. In this section, we therefore present
an attack technique against the ITRU cryptosystem, it is mainly based on a
simple frequency analysis preformed with SageMath Software. As a result,
this technique will recover the corresponding plaintexts immediately with no
need of having the private keys. Indeed, the attack is via eavesdropping on
some encrypted messages. If the message is too short, then the attack fails.
Moreover, according to the index of coincidence introduced by Friedman [8]
the language of the plaintext can be identified (e.g. in case of English it is
about 0.0686). Therefore, once we identify the language correctly, then the
frequency analysis works very well in practice. However, it is assumed that
most samples of text written in English would have a similar distribution of
letters only if the text is long enough, one may ask the following question:
what is the minimum length of a ciphertext for which this attack operates ef-
ficiently? A brief answer to this question is presented in the following remark.
Indeed, it is interpreted formally with more details in ([45, pp. 110-119]) and
([3, pp. 283-285]).
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Remark 4.1. Given a ciphertext C in a symmetric key cryptosystem
(particularly, a substitution cipher), it seems reasonable to suppose that the
longer that C is, the fewer the number of intelligible plaintext messages M
there are corresponding to C. Shannon [39], [40] showed that there exists a
critical length U called the unicity point such that if the length of ciphertext
C is longer than this length then there is likely to be just one corresponding
plaintext M. In fact, Shannon showed that U can be calculated as roughly the
point where the message entropy plus the key entropy is less than or equal to
the cipher text entropy. More precisely, the unicity point is calculated as the
following:
(4.1) U = H(K)log |Γ| −H(Γ) =
log |K|
log |Γ| −H(Γ) ,
where H(K) = log |K| represents the entropy of the key-space such that |K|
forms the number of permutations of the letters in the key K (it is usually
assumed that all the keys are equally likely to be chosen), H(Γ) denotes the
the entropy per symbol of the language Γ being used, and |Γ| is the number
of the letters in the language Γ.
Since we are interested in substitution ciphers over the English alphabet,
let us here calculate the unicity point. Since the English language contains
26 letters, then there are 26! possible keys, i.e. |K| = 26!. Taking log |Γ| =
log(26) = 4.7 and the entropy of English to be 2 bits per letter (which is
probably a little high), i.e. H(Γ) = 2. From (4.1) we get that
U = log(26!)4.7− 2 =
88.4
2.7 ≈ 32.
This means if the ciphertext C has length of 32 letters or more we expect
there to be just one meaningful plaintext M. This is fairly good agreement
with the empirical observation of Shannon [40], who claimed that the unicity
point can be shown experimentally to lie between 20 and 30. In the same
ballpark, Friedman [9] claimed that ’practically every example of 25 or more
characters representing monoalphabetic encipherment of a "sensible" message
in English can be readily solved’.
However, this attack technique can be applied on any encrypted message
using the ITRU cryptosystem, let us preform this technique on the follow-
ing paragraph from the article describing ITRU cryptosystem [11] (without
spaces):










If this paragraph is encrypted with the large modulus q = 1104427 and
the public key h = 37619, then the ciphertext starts as
301036, 301056, 301053, 301055, 301063, 301049, 301060, 301063, 301054, ....
In fact, there are 32 different numbers appearing in the ciphertext these are
between 300992 and 301073. A simple frequency analysis with the function
frequency_distribution() provides the following data:
[(301056, 0.0380313199105145), (301057, 0.0850111856823266),
(301060, 0.0313199105145414), (301061, 0.0290827740492170),
(301062, 0.0648769574944072), (301063, 0.0738255033557047),
(301064, 0.0313199105145414), (301066, 0.0536912751677852),
(301067, 0.0850111856823266), (301068, 0.0693512304250559),
(301069, 0.0201342281879195), (301070, 0.0111856823266219),
(301071, 0.0111856823266219), (301072, 0.00223713646532438),
(301073, 0.0134228187919463), (300992, 0.00223713646532438),
(300993, 0.00223713646532438), (300996, 0.00671140939597315),
(300998, 0.00894854586129754), (301025, 0.00671140939597315),
(301030, 0.00671140939597315), (301034, 0.0134228187919463),
(301036, 0.0156599552572707), (301037, 0.0134228187919463),
(301039, 0.00447427293064877), (301049, 0.0693512304250559),
(301050, 0.00894854586129754), (301051, 0.0357941834451902),
(301052, 0.0246085011185682), (301053, 0.109619686800895),
(301054, 0.0223713646532438), (301055, 0.0290827740492170)]
We see that the number 301053 appears the most in the ciphertext. There-
fore, 301053 represents either ′e′,′ a′ or ′t′. If it is ′e′, then we apply the
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formula
ci − 300952,
where ci represents the ciphertext blocks in the ASCII character code for all
i. Thus, we get a sequence of numbers starting with
84, 104, 101, 103, 111, 97, 108, 111, 102, ....
Finally, if we consider it as a sequence of ASCII codes and determine the
corresponding plaintext, then we get the encoded message.
5. Can ITRU be fixed?
Our main aim of this paper is in fact to show that the ITRU cryptosystem
is only a substitution cipher in which the authors proposed to encode each
letter individually using the same key. As consequence, this cipher can be
attacked easily using a simple frequency analysis technique as described ear-
lier. Nevertheless, we could propose some corrections that make ITRU secure
against such attacks. First, we can either use a different r for each letter of
the ciphertext, or we encode the message not as a sequence of integers but
as one absolutely huge integer. Moreover, in practice we use PKC to encode
a bit string that will be used in a subsequent symmetric cipher, like AES, so
we could assume that m is the number corresponding to this bit string (so a
number of size 2N where e.g. N = 128).
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Kriptoanaliza ITRU kriptosustava
Hayder R. Hashim, Alexandra Molnár i Szabolcs Tengely
Sažetak. Kriptosustav ITRU je kriptosustav s javnim
ključem i jedna od poznatih inačica kriptosustava NTRU. Umje-
sto na prstenu krnjih polinoma, ITRU kriptosistem zasnovan je
na prstenu cijelih brojeva. Njegovi autori su tvrdili da ITRU
ima bolje značajke u odnosu na klasični NTRU, poput jednos-
tavnog algoritma za odabir parametara, invertibilnosti, uspješnog
dešifriranja poruka i bolje sigurnosti. U ovom članku predstav-
ljamo tehniku napada na ITRU kriptosustav, koja se uglavnom
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